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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFFS' ANALYSIS IGNORES THE LAW THAT 
APPLIES TO TRUST LANDS AND THE USE AND DISPOSITION OF 
TRUST ASSETS, 
Plaintiffs7 analysis of the two major issues of estoppel and 
the meaning of the royalty clause in the lease ignores the recent 
decisions from surrounding states and the Supreme Court of the 
United States regarding State trust lands. If the requirements 
imposed by the United States Supreme Court and other state courts 
is applied to the facts and issues of this case, judgment should 
enter in favor of the State upholding the audits and requiring 
the Plaintiffs to pay fair market value for its use of trust 
assets. 
Even if this Court were to reject the law regarding State 
trust lands and follow Plaintiffs7 argument, there are issues of 
fact in dispute regarding both the application of estoppel and 
the meaning of the lease provisions. The case will need to be 
remanded to the trial court to resolve the alleged ambiguity in 
the lease provision and to determine whether there are facts to 
support the claim of estoppel. 
1 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DID NOT ADDRESS 
THE QUESTION OF WAIVER OR THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE 
AUDIT WAS SUBJECT TO THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE RULE 
MAKING ACT. 
At page 62, of their Brief, Plaintiffs argue, that the 
district court found that the State's audit was subject to the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. A review of the court's 
Memorandum Decision shows that the trial court did not address 
that issue. 
The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-
46a-l, et. seq. , is not applicable to this case. The State has 
not promulgated any new policy or new rule as defined in Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46a-2. The State has not adopted a new policy or 
rule, but rather is enforcing the terms of an existing coal 
lease. An audit and then the subsequent enforcement of the terms 
of the lease are not considered rule making or policy making. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-2(8). 
At page 53, of Plaintiffs' Brief, Plaintiffs allege that the 
trial court found that the State may not retroactively apply a 
new policy imposing a royalty rate of 8%. A review of the 
Memorandum Decision of the trial court shows that there was no 
ruling by the court on this question. The trial court did not 
rule that there was a new policy nor did it address the 
retroactive application of any alleged new policy. 
Plaintiffs, in the Table of Contents of their Brief under 
Section IIG, claim that the district court found that the State 
waived its right to demand payment of royalties^. The heading in 
2 
the body of the Brief deleted the phrase regarding the district 
court ruling on the question of waiver. A review of the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision shows that the trial court did not 
rule on the question of waiver. The trial court's decision was 
based on estoppel. Estoppel and waiver are distinct doctrines 
which have different and separate elements. Hunter vs. Hunter, 
669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). The doctrine of waiver requires a 
voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right. The 
undisputed facts in this case will not support such a finding. 
The undisputed facts show that the State issued, to the 
Plaintiffs, blank royalty reporting forms and relied on the 
Plaintiffs to correctly report and pay royalties for coal removed 
from State trust lands. The Plaintiffs did not report and pay 
the correct royalty. When the State set up an auditing division 
and audited its State coal leases it found, at that time, the 
failure of the Plaintiffs to pay correct royalties. The State 
then took immediate action to demand payment of the royalties 
that were owed. There are no facts that show a voluntary, 
intentional relinquishment, by the State, to collect the 
royalties that were owed for the Coal removed from State trust 
lands. Furthermore, as discussed in the State's Brief the 
doctrine regarding State trust lands precludes the application of 
waiver against the State. 
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POINT III. THE SCHOOL TRUST LAND ACCOUNT IS ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER INTEREST ON THE DELINQUENT ROYALTIES. 
The audit and demand for payment also included a demand for 
payment of interest on the delinquent royalties. To make the 
trust account whole, the trust account is entitled to receive 
interest on the monies owed to the trust account from the date of 
delinquency until paid. Otherwise, the trust account would not 
receive full value for its money. Plaintiff argues that the 
State is only entitled to interest on delinquent royalties from 
the date demand is made and bases that argument on Staker vs. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Company, 664 P. 2d 1188 (Utah 
1983) . The rule, as stated in Staker vs. Huntington Cleveland 
Irrigation Company, is not applicable to this case. The rule in 
Staker applies when a party has made an overpayment and then 
requests a refund. There is no overpayment in this case, there 
is an underpayment. When a party is delinquent or underpays an 
obligation interest is owed from the date of the delinquency. 
Biork vs. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 317 (Utah 1977). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision did not find that there was a new 
policy by the State or that the doctrine of waiver applied. The 
trial court did not include those grounds in its ruling because 
there were no facts to support those arguments. The facts and 
issues in this case should be analyzed under law regarding school 
trust lands. When that law is applied the audit should be upheld 
and the case remanded to the trial court with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of the State upholding the decision of 
the Director of State lands. 
Respectfully submitted this /(p day of September, 1988. 
NIELSEN &/£3NI0R 
Attorney^ for Appellant 
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Clir^/B. Allied 
By: A W j l ^ ^ 
Gayle ^. McKeachnie 
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